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abstract  The paper asks for the preconditions and the consequences of the 
emergence of aesthetics in and for philosophy. The question is: what does it 
mean for philosophy to engage the question of the aesthetic? My answer will be: 
it means nothing less than putting philosophy in question. Or, more precisely: 
by engaging the question of the aesthetic, philosophy puts itself in question. In 
order to show this, I will refer to a brief passage in the Phenomenology of the 
Spirit and then attempt to turn it against what I take it to be Hegel’s own inten­
tion. The paper attempts to sketch this argument in three brisk moves by (1) 
distinguishing a philosophy of the “poetic” from a philosophy of the “aesthetic”; 
(2) describing the aesthetic as “regressive” and “(self­)reflexive”; and (3) sketch­
ing the paradoxical place of aesthetics within philosophy.
keywords  The aesthetic, the poetic, Aristotle, Hegel, aesthetics within phil­
osophy
In this paper I want to ask for the preconditions of the emergence of aesthet-
ics in philosophy and for the consequences that this emergence of aesthet-
ics had for philosophy. The question is: what does it mean for philos ophy to 
engage the question of the “aesthetic”? My answer will be: it means nothing 
less than putting philosophy in question. Or, more precisely: by engaging 
the question of the aesthetic, philosophy puts itself in question. 
In order to show this, I proceed in three brisk moves. (1) I will dis-
tinguish a philosophy of the aesthetic from a philosophy of the poetic, 
or aesthetics from poetics; (2) I will describe the aesthetic as regressive 
and reflexive; (3) I will sketch the paradoxical place of aesthetics within 
philosophy.
 1
According to Aristotle’s definition, “poetics” is the name of an investiga-
tion that concerns “[p]oetry, its essence and its several species, with the 
characteristic function of each species and the way in which plots must be 
constructed if the poem is to be a success.”2 Aristotle understood this as the 
philosophical investigation of a mode of representation and experience 
that is itself (almost) already philosophical. The well-known distinction 
offered in Book 9 of the Poetics between poetry and history is this: 
the difference between a historian and a poet is not that one writes in prose and 
the other in verse […] The real difference is this, that one tells what happened 
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and the other what might happen. For this reason poetry is something more 
scientific [philo sophôteron, more philosophical] and serious than history, be-
cause poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts. 
(Poetics, 1451 a–b) 
The modes of representation seem to be capable of being ordered along 
a scale that extends from the particular to the universal, from the repre-
sentation of an event to the representation of a form. History and phil-
osophy constitute the extremes of this scale. Poetry lies between them; 
it is not (or no longer) concerned with what a particular human being 
really did, but (already) with what “a certain type of man will do or say 
either probably or necessarily.”3 Understood correctly, then, the compara-
tive placement of historiography and poetry Aristotle offers according 
to their respective distance from or proximity to philosophy does not 
assign a firm location to poetry, let alone one halfway between history 
and philosophy. Rather, the comparative degree of the adjective – “more 
philosophical” – indicates a progression, an approximation of poetry to 
philosophy. Poetry is “more philosophical” than history because it is in 
motion, on its way from the one to the other, away from the representa-
tion of the merely particular toward that of the universal, toward philos-
ophy. Poetry can be addressed as something “more philosophical” than 
historiography because the becoming of philosophy begins with poetry. 
Aristotle also writes in the Metaphysics à propos of his elucidation 
of what it means that philosophy begins with wonder, that the “lover 
of myths,” of tales and narratives (philómuthos), is already “in a sense a 
philosopher.”4 This view is confirmed from the side of poetry, when the 
chorus in Sophocles’ King Oedipus, as the observer of the hero’s history, 
at the end of the tragedy commences a process of contemplation, of re-
flection on the events, that will lead to an insight into the form of human 
happiness and into its dependence on fate:
chorus. Dwellers in our native land of Thebes, see to what a storm of cruel 
disaster has come Oedipus here, who knew the answer to the famous riddle 
and was a mighty man, on whose fortune every one among the citizens used 
to look with envy! So that one should wait to see the final day and should call 
none among mortals fortunate, till he has crossed the bourne of life without 
suffering grief.5
This insight that the tragic chorus articulates and which Aristotle will 
reframe as a philosophical insight (and discuss critically) in Book 1 of 
the Nicomachean Ethics6 is a universal insight. Here, at the end of the 
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tragic poem, still within the poem or on its margin, a consideration be-
gins which will transform the perception and sensation whose object is 
the particular fate, the fate of this one human being and the event of his 
tragic downfall, into an insight into the fate of the human being as such. 
With this insight, poetry transitions into philosophy; the end of poetry 
is the beginning of philosophy.
This proposition, which marks the destination of Aristotle’s Poetics, is 
taken up by Hegel, who reads it from its end, that is to say, backwards: if 
the end of poetry is the beginning of philosophy – as Sophocles’ tragedy 
shows and Aristotle’s Poetics states – then the beginning of philosophy is 
the end of poetry. This Hegelian inversion does not dispute the original 
meaning of the proposition; to the contrary, it presupposes it. For Hegel, 
too, poetry is “more philosophical” than (ordinary) historiography.7 But 
poetry’s being “more philosophical” than history is not tantamount to its 
being philosophy. Hegel writes in the Phenomenology of the Spirit: 
Just as it is essential for the statue to be the work of human hands, so is the ac-
tor essential to his mask – not as an external condition from which artistically 
considered [in der Kunstbetrachtung] we must abstract; or, so far as we do have 
to make abstraction from it, we admit just this, that Art does not yet contain 
in it the true and proper self.8 
If “containing” and unfolding “the true and proper self” can be regarded 
as one definition of philosophy, then art and its “consideration” stand, ac-
cording to Hegel, under the law of not yet being – and of being incapable 
of ever becoming – philosophy. The claim that art, in contrast with phil-
osophy, “does not yet contain in it the true and proper self” has a double 
meaning: art is the representation of an act that does not yet fully com-
prehend itself, that is to say, the representation of an act that is not yet 
in the full sense conscious of itself;9 and – which is to say, because – art 
is itself an act, an act of representing, that does not yet fully comprehend 
itself, that is not yet in the full sense conscious of itself. Art, in contrast 
with philosophy, “does not yet contain in it the true and proper self” be-
cause its representation, and hence also that which is represented in it, is 
not yet fully comprehended.
The shift from Aristotle’s to Hegel’s definition of the relation between 
poetry and philosophy, a shift Hegel enacts, following Aristotle, on the 
example of tragedy – one from “almost already” to “not yet,” from poetry 
as the beginning of philosophy to philosophy as the end of poetry – is 
both slight, a mere shift of accent, and momentous. For this shift ex-
presses precisely the new transformed understanding of poetry or art 
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that is terminologically indicated by the invention of the concept of the 
“aesthetic.”10 Only a poetic notion of poetry can seek to recognize in it 
the beginning of philosophy. Understanding poetry poetically means 
tracing it back to an insight and to an act that are (almost) already philo-
sophical: because poetic insight, just like philosophical insight, regards 
not any particular event but its universal form, and because the act of 
poetic representation, the concatenation of events into a fable, is – thus 
Aristotle’s definition of “mimesis” – the imitation of this universal form. 
When Hegel, by contrast, defines art on the basis of its relating to phil-
osophy as a “not yet,” he no longer understands it poetically, basing his 
argument instead on its new “aesthetic” definition. For the aesthetic, not 
only, is not the philosophical, which is to say, something other than the 
philosophical; for so is the poetic. The aesthetic, rather, is “not yet” the 
philosophical because it means a kind or dimension of experience, and a 
kind of dimension of representation that remains before or beneath any 
transparent self-consciousness. That art, unlike philosophy, does not yet 
“contain in it the true and proper self” means that art is something that 
has fallen behind – something below the true self. And this is precisely 
what it means to understand art “aesthetically.”
2
Hegel’s definition of art under the sign of “not yet” describes art by virtue 
of an essential deficiency: it does not yet “contain in it the true and proper 
self.” In this, Hegel’s definition of art is an “aesthetic” one in the specific, 
i.e. specifically modern sense of that term. Hegel’s definition of art is 
specifically aesthetic moreover in that it defines this aesthetic deficiency 
– the deficiency that is the aesthetic – as a deficiency of knowledge, or to 
be precise, of knowledge of itself, as a deficiency of self-consciousness: 
while the “higher language” of art does not have “the unconscious natu-
ralness and naivety […] [of] the language accompanying ordinary actions 
in real life;” while the “higher language” of art is thus, also according to 
Hegel, conscious, artificial, and sentimental or reflexive; art remains at 
the same time incapable of “know[ing]” and “assert[ing]” its own act of 
making – the making of the statue by human hands, the making of the 
heroes by the actor.11 Art essentially eludes itself: its act of making or do-
ing is not an object of its knowing or a content of its saying.
By describing art through a severance between doing and knowing, 
Hegel indicates precisely its newly gained aesthetic definition. Yet Hegel 
simultaneously misunderstands this aesthetic divergence by describing 
it as the knowledge of art falling behind its doing. Aesthetically, the in-
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verse is true: the doing of art falls behind, it escapes its knowing. The 
deficiency of knowledge that is characteristic of art is not exterior to 
its doing but rather defines the doing of art as an aesthetic doing. In 
overcoming this deficiency, that is to say, in gaining consciousness of its 
doing, art would thus precipitate its own disappearance. The knowledge 
of art’s doing would not be a knowledge of art’s doing. The doing that 
we can know because it is a doing by force of “the true and proper self” 
– a doing that is an expression of knowledge (on the part of the self that 
does) and can thus become an object of knowledge (on the part of the 
observing self)– this knowable, because self-conscious, doing is not art’s 
doing. The doing of art is not a knowable doing because it is not self-
conscious. This is the positive, and that is to say: the aesthetic version of 
Hegel’s negative proposition regarding art: that art does not know of its 
doing means that the doing of art is not an object of knowing because it 
is not grounded in knowing. Art’s doing eludes knowledge.
Philosophical aesthetics is the theory of such a doing: the theory of 
a doing that is not an expression nor an object of knowledge; a doing 
before and beyond all knowledge.12 This doing, whose theory is philo-
sophical aesthetics, engages images and representations (in the wide 
sense of both words) productively and receptively, engendering and 
apprehending them; the subject matter of aesthetics is the making of 
images and representations. Because it eludes knowledge, philosophical 
aesthetics calls this making “dark” (Baumgarten): it is not a clear and self-
conscious but an “unconscious” doing (Herder). Aesthetics says of this 
dark doing not only that it is “stronger” than the clear or self-conscious 
one (whence Baumgarten calls philosophical aesthetics also by the name 
of “emphaseologia”). It says of this dark doing also that it constitutes 
the “ground” (of the soul: fundus animae) that is presupposed by and at 
the same time replaced by the higher, self-conscious operations of the 
subject. Insofar as art “contains” (Hegel) its doing as a dark one, the soul 
experiences through art its own ground.
Aesthetics understands this also in the sense of a regression: the aes-
thetic is the medium of a return into the aboriginally dark making of 
images at the beginning of the soul’s activity. Yet that art, aesthetically 
understood, is a return into the ground (of the soul) must be under-
stood not solely as a regression, but also as a reflection: the aesthetic, 
as a regression into the ground, is the medium of a particular form of 
self-reflection. “Aesthetic” is thus not merely the name for a different, a 
“dark” mode of making representations, one which – thus Baumgarten 
– stands in “analogy” to the “clear” one. “Aesthetic,” rather, is the name 
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for an altogether different kind of regarding and performing the making 
of representations; a kind of performing, moreover, that transforms the 
non-aesthetic making of representations by its self-reflection: the aes-
thetic kind of regarding and performing transmutes the clear and self-
conscious act of representing into a dark and unconscious one by discov-
ering and unfolding underneath, or indeed within the act, and that is to 
say, in any act, of representing – of a representation whose ground seems 
to be the “true and proper” subject, conscious of itself – its “dark ground.” 
“Aesthetic” thus means, and decidedly so since Herder’s critical transfor-
mation of Baumgarten’s project, a genealogical form of reflection: a form 
of reflection that unfolds within the clear, and hence against the clear, its 
own dark ground. That is why the aesthetic-genealogical reflection can 
at the same time exist only as an aesthetic practice: the dark ground is 
not a potential object of knowledge, but rather becomes apparent only 
in a performance – in a different performance of the act of representing. 
Aesthetic representation exists only as an aestheticization of the act of 
representing: as an aesthetic transformation of representation such that 
the latter’s dark ground becomes apparent.
Thus, the decisive difference between the poetic and the aesthetic, 
between art considered as almost already philosophical and as not yet 
philosophical, emerges. Following Wolfgang Iser, one can describe the 
step from a poetic to an aesthetic notion of art as an “interiorization of 
possibility.”13 – Poetry, poetically understood, is the realization of a pre-
existing possibility: the poem consists in a composition of events that 
imitates an action that, while not having taken place in reality, is pos-
sible. “Possible” means in this context: in accordance with those trajecto-
ries of action that are (for us) probable or even necessary. In the poetic 
composition of events, those possibilities become apparent which we, 
without quite becoming aware of the fact, actualize in our lives; poetry 
makes explicit, and thus displays, probable possibilities of life. – With 
the aesthetic understanding of art, by contrast, possibility seems to have 
“emigrated out of Nature [or out of “life”14] and into the artist’s mind;”15 
for art, aesthetically understood, is not an imitation of that which is prob-
able in the life-world but rather an exploration of “forms of perceptibil-
ity” and representability, of the “plenum” of possibilities16 – but of the 
possibilities not of life, imitated by art, but of representation itself. Art, 
aesthetically understood, unfolds the play of the imagination as a 
process of gaining and simultaneously of playing down the gains. It [sc. the 
aesthetic play of “force” or “difference”] thus becomes not only variable but, in 
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principle, also serial. Serial variability […] would then be one characteristic of 
the aesthetic. What is concealed here could be illuminated by a sentence from 
Borges: “that imminence of a revelation that is not yet produced is, perhaps, 
the aesthetic reality.”17
The aesthetic interiorization of the possible described by Iser must not 
be taken to be a subjectivization in any established sense of that term. 
And this also means, conversely, that if aesthetics speaks of the “subject” 
(and indeed, philosophical aesthetics is the first one to do so in the mod-
ern sense of the word: it does so in the chapter of Baumgarten’s Meta-
physics where, in a single move, the legitimacy of dark representations 
is posited against the privilege of clear ones and the soul is addressed as 
the “subject,” that is, as ground) it does so in order to relate representa-
tions back to possibilities, to potentiality, and thus to think representa-
tions not as something that occurs but rather as something that is made 
or produced. Yet the possibilities that produce representations, aestheti-
cally understood, are at the same time not the “property” of a subject of 
which the latter knows and over which it freely disposes. The aesthetic 
subject does not have possibilities, it is possibility: “anima mea est vis” 
(Baumgarten). To put it another way, the meaning of “possibility” funda-
mentally changes in the process of its aesthetic interiorization. Under-
stood poetically, that is to say, on Aristotle’s terms, possibility is related to 
universality, to the universality of a form. Possibility is the ability to ac-
tualize a universal form (and thus to render it concrete and specific). To 
have an ability means to be able to do something, and hence, to be able to 
bring something to success. A subject with abilities is a master; “possibil-
ity,” poetically understood, is mastery. The aesthetic possible, by contrast, 
is paradoxical: a “process of gaining and simultaneously of playing down 
the gains” (Iser); that is to say, ability and inability at once.
To offer a terminological frame for this distinction: the aesthetic pos-
sible is not an ability but a force. A force, too, is productive, but while 
the realization of an ability is an instance of success or accomplishment, 
a force produces a mere effect. Subjective abilities are the possibility of 
successful conjunctions of the universal and the particular, of univer-
sal form and particular case; aesthetic forces are the possibility of effec-
tive conjunctions of particulars with each other, of this and that event. 
Abilities realize themselves in action, that is to say, in the constitutively 
teleological act of doing what is good. Forces unfold in play,18 that is to 
say, in the serial connection and disconnection and reconnection and 
again disconnection of events. The poetic subject (which is not yet called 
Not Yet
41
“subject”) is thus like the practical one: it realizes in an example, and 
thus also in an exemplary manner, the possible universal. The aesthetic 
subject (which is now called “subject,” but is precisely not a subject in the 
common philosophical sense) unfolds the play of forces, and is thus no 
longer – or rather, with Hegel, not yet – practical. It does not know itself, 
and so is incapable of anything; again and again, it dissolves what it has 
– equally without intention – constructed.
3 
When Hegel claims “that Art does not yet contain in it the true and 
proper self,” he states the constitutive, i.e., insuperable behind-ness of 
the aesthetic vis-à-vis the philosophical. I have suggested that this claim 
is borne out once we understand the aesthetic as the medium of an un-
folding of “forces” (in distinction to “abilities”) that is prior to (or: not yet) 
self-consciousness. At the same time, Hegel insists on the reflexive, even 
self-reflexive character of the aesthetic. In Hegel’s view, at least the view 
advocated in the Phenomenology of the Spirit (which is the closest Hegel 
ever came to contemporary early Romanticism), the aesthetic contains 
not yet the “true and proper self” but already a form of self-reflection. For 
in the chapter on “Religion in the Form of Art,” Hegel not only insists 
on the difference between “cult” and art by claiming that whereas “cult” 
is “actual practice,” all art is “Vorstellung” – imagination or, more accu-
rately, presentation, performance.19 Hegel also, closely following Schiller 
and Friedrich Schlegel, draws a distinction between two forms of art, of 
artistic presentation: the first or “earliest language” (erste Sprache)20 of 
epic art and the later and “higher language” (höhere Sprache) of tragedy.21 
Hegel writes on epic art:
The Minstrel [of the epic song] is the individual and actual Spirit from whom, 
as a subject of this world, it [the world] is produced and by whom it is borne. 
His “pathos” is not the stupefying power of Nature [a critique of Plato’s account 
of poetry as being produced out of “inspiration and possession”] but Mnemos-
yne, recollection and a gradually developed inwardness, the remembrance of 
essence that formerly [in cult] was directly [immediately] present. He is the 
organ that vanishes in its content; what counts is not his own self but his Muse, 
his universal song.22
The earliest language of epic art is defined by the erasure of the fact of 
its own presentation. It is as though its content presented itself. The lan-
guage of epic art is defined as neutral representation of “a reality, which, 
in content and in manner of presentation, is complete in itself and re-
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mote from the narrator as an individual.”23 By contrast, Hegel speaks 
of tragedy as a “higher language” because it does not retreat behind the 
objectivity of its content, but emerges in its genuine poetic character, as 
the act of speaking:
 
In regard to form, the language ceases to be narrative because it enters into the 
content, just as the content ceases to be one that is imaginatively presented. 
The hero is himself the speaker.24
Indeed, the characters of tragedy are themselves “artists” – artists of 
themselves –, for they are presented in tragedy as actively presenting 
(themselves). Epic representation is replaced by the self-reflexive aware-
ness of the performative process of its creation. Hegel defines the “higher 
language” of tragedy in exactly the same way in which Friedrich Schlegel 
had spoken of a poetry that, “by analogy to philosophical terminology[,] 
must be called transcendental poetry” because it is “critical” and “presents 
its producing along with its product.” It is “always […] simulta neously po-
etry and the poetry of poetry,” which “presents itself along with each of 
its presentations.”25
Hegel’s (as one might say: “Romantic”) insistence on the self-reflexive 
structure of the aesthetic form of art is crucial for an adequate under-
standing of the way in which aesthetics contrasts the serial variability of 
the play of forces with the successful actualization of practical abilities. 
For it would be a severe misunderstanding to take this to be just another 
inversion of Platonism. Plato’s reservation regarding poets (the reserva-
tion which Aristotle’s remark that the “myth-lover” is also “in a certain 
sense a philosopher” intended to reject) was this: 
For all the good epic poets utter all those fine poems not from art, but as in-
spired and possessed, and the good lyric poets likewise; just as the Corybantian 
worshippers do not dance when in their senses, so the lyric poets do not indite 
those fine songs in their senses, but when they have started on the melody and 
rhythm they begin to be frantic, and it is under possession – as the bacchants 
are possessed […] – that the soul of the lyric poets does the same thing, by their 
own report.26 
Poetry – thus Gadamer’s précis of the Platonic view – is “divine mania 
and possession,” and thus “in any case […] no knowledge, no ability that 
were able to give an account of itself and its truth.”27 Poetry is not a prac-
tical performance, not an act; its ground is not a practical knowledge, 
not an ability; the poem, hence, not a practical work, not a “good thing” 
– thus the series (and unity) of the Platonic objections. Does the aesthetic 
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definition of art – the question would seem inevitable – not just repeat 
these dual oppositions? Is what Plato calls art’s “obsession” and its un-
conscious speech not the same as what aesthetics call “dark,” its ground 
and play of forces – the only difference being that aesthetics invert the 
valuations that accompany an identical description?
Yet to read philosophical aesthetics as an inverse Platonism means 
to miss the decisive trait highlighted by Hegel’s distinction between the 
“earliest language” of epic and the “higher language” of tragedy and in-
deed of all art that has become “aesthetic”: it ignores the fact that the 
aesthetic is itself reflexive. Socrates describes the poet not as one who 
speaks from his own knowledge, “by art,” but as one who is driven “by 
divine influence (dynamis)”; the poets are “merely the interpreters of the 
gods.”28 What speaks through the poet is exterior to him, precedes him; 
the poet – thus the young Nietzsche approvingly quotes this Socratic 
image – “sounds forth from the abyss of being.”29 By contrast, the “dark 
ground,” that is, the abyss of which aesthetics speaks, is located within 
the poet; and moreover, paradoxically, it is located precisely where he 
has rational abilities whose self-conscious employment constitutes the 
poet, insofar as he is also a master, a practical subject. The artistic act, 
aesthetically understood, consists not in unconsciously passing on the 
whisperings of the muses but in transmuting one’s own self-conscious 
abilities (back) into unconscious forces. This transmutation of abilities 
into forces, of act into play is the aesthetic. The aesthetic, then, is not the 
reverse instead of the obverse – the play of forces instead of the realiza-
tion of an ability. The aesthetic is the reverse of, and hence with, the 
obverse. The play of forces, aesthetically understood, is the underground 
or abyss within the realization of abilities. The aesthetic play of forces 
that emerges by transmutation from the realization of practical abilities 
thus always remains related back to the realization of practical abilities. 
By this very token, the aesthetic is constitutively reflexive: it exists only 
in its emergence from the practical which it is not. Understood in Pla-
tonic terms, poetry is the other of a practice founded on knowledge and 
mastery; aesthetically understood, poetry unfolds the other within the 
practice founded on knowledge and mastery.
In closing, I would like to return to the relationship between art (in 
the aesthetic sense) and philosophy. The hypothesis I would like to advo-
cate runs as follows: if one understands, with Hegel, the aesthetic as in 
itself reflexive, or as self-reflexive, then the relationship between art and 
philosophy attains a structure different from the teleological one that 
Hegel’s “not yet” indicates. If Hegel is right in understanding aesthetic 
Christoph Menke
44
art as a form of reflection, and if I am right in understanding the self-
reflection of aesthetic art as a regression from ability to force, then there 
is no common standard by which to measure art and philosophy alike in 
order to judge that art is “not yet” on a par with the achievements of phi-
losophy. Rather, if art is aesthetic precisely by being self-reflexive (and 
vice versa), the relationship between art and philosophy is a relationship 
of infinite strife.
Plato was able to promise a resolution of the strife between philos-
ophy and poetry – which already he called “old” – because he construed 
this strife as the external opposition between mastery and enthusiasm, 
between one’s own practical ability and divine power. For if practical 
mastery and poetic enthusiasm operate separately, then they can be 
severed as well. The antagonistic conjunction of abilities and forces, by 
contrast, renders the dispute between philosophy and poetry or art ir-
resolvable. This irresolvable dispute between philosophy and art takes 
place within philosophy itself; its site is aesthetics. By defining the aes-
thetic as a reflexive transformation of practice, as a re-transmutation of 
its abilities into forces, aesthetics thus carries philosophy’s dispute with 
art into philosophy such that the latter, philosophy, is no longer capable 
of resolving it.
The new dispute between philosophy and art, the one whose site is 
aesthetics, is a consequence of the fact that both sides are simultane-
ously antagonists and conjoined.30 The “old” dispute between philosophy 
and poetry of which Plato speaks and which he promises to end was 
one over the ground and the medium of practical wisdom: does wis-
dom originate in poetic enthusiasm or in rational thought? Aesthetics, 
by contrast, is the dispute of two modes of reflection. The aesthetic is a 
mode of reflection on practice, but then so is philosophy. Both modes 
of reflection engage the same object: they are reflections on practice, 
and primarily: on the practice of comprehension and representation. In 
their reflections, they develop contrasting images of this practice. The 
image created by philosophical reflection is one of a correspondence be-
tween mastery and success: philosophy intends to explain that we can 
have true knowledge, that we can offer convincing arguments, that we 
can make just decisions, that we can form good intentions. Philosophy 
makes this comprehensible by examining our abilities. For to have and 
to realize abilities means to bring something to success. The aesthetic 
creates a contrasting image of practice by inciting in us – as Friedrich 
Schlegel put it, speaking of Socratic irony – “a feeling of indissoluble 
antagonism between the absolute [das Unbedingte] and the relative [das 
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Bedingte].”31 In the aesthetic performance, the practical correspondence 
of abilities and success is shattered in the antagonism between the play 
of forces and their uncontrolled effects.
As aesthetics unfolds their dispute, these two contrasting modes of 
reflection, the philosophical and the aesthetic one, are tied by a simul-
taneous double, and moreover doubly asymmetrical, conjunction. For 
aesthetics renders the aesthetic an object of philosophical reflection: 
aesthetics is a philosophical reflection on the aesthetic reflection – a 
philosophical reflection that seeks to prove for the aesthetic exactly the 
correspondence of ability and success that constitutes its definition of 
practice. Yet as the aesthetic itself is constitutively reflexive, it does not 
remain a mere object upon or on which philosophy reflects. As the aes-
thetic itself is the medium of an autochthonous and idiosyncratic re-
flection that engages in turn that practice of the philosophical reflection 
which engages it, the aesthetic, the latter, the aesthetic as an object, is 
simultaneously an opposite, and indeed an opponent and antagonist of 
the philosophical reflection. With the turn of the philosophical reflection 
toward the aesthetic – with the turn, that is, that defines aesthetics – phi-
losophy thus turns toward something that turns back against it, against 
philosophy. When philosophy began to think the aesthetic as a reflexive 
performance, it consigned itself to a dispute that it can no longer decide 
in favor of either of the two sides.
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